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NOTES AND COMMENTS
court modified its former ruling, stating that it did so in order to
conform to the rule of another state which had an identical statute.
As a matter of fact the rule in that other state was, at that time
diametrically opposite to the rule then being promulgated. 13
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in attempting to construe
an ambiguous statute which merely sets up one scale of compensation
for total disability in one section and another scale for specific in-
juries in another section of the law lays down the rule that the pro-
visions of these sections are not mutually exclusive, and holds that
recovery may be had consecutively under each of them.
In a recent case it has held that when an employee sustained a
badly lacerated hand, necessitating immediate amputation of fingers,
he was entitled to compensation for total disability during the healing
period, and to full compensation for the loss of his fingers after the
wounds had healed.' 4 It is submitted that this is a sound result.
Under any other interpretation of the law it is quite possible that in
case of a long healing period after the extent of the specific injuries
has been determined, the statutory period will have run before the
injured man is able to return to work. In such case the employee
would not only lose a good share of his earnings over a long period
of time but would return to industry without a cent of indemnity
for the injury that was permanent in character-a result that could
hardly have been within the contemplation of the legislature in pass-
ing the act. There is no indication within the statute itself that it
was intended that the two sections construed in the principal case
should be mutually exclusive. The decision serves well what seems
to be the underlying purpose of all Workmen's Compensation Laws.
ALLEN LANGSTON.
Workmen's Compensation-Recovery for Injuries
Resulting from Horseplay
The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act' provides that
compensable injuries are only those injuries "by accident arising out
of and in the course of the employment." An employee was injured
by the accidental discharge of a gun in the hands of a fellow-em-
ployee. The injured man took no part in the "horseplay," but was
' Gobble v. Clinch Valley Lumber Co., supra note 6.
"Rice v. Denny Roll and Panel Co., 199 N. C. 154, 154 S. E. 69 (1930).
'N. C. PuB. LAws (1929)'c. 120, §2 (f); N. C. ANx. CODE (Michie, Supp.
1929) §8081 (i).
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at the time busily at work. Held, the injury arose out of the em-
ployment, and recovery allowed.2
When an employee at work sustains an injury due to some play-
ful act of his fellow-employees, he is the victim of "horseplay."8
"With practical uniformity, the courts hold, both under the English
act and also under the various American statutes, that an injury
occasioned by some sportive act of a fellow-workman does not arise
out of the employment within the meaning of the governing statute,
and consequently that its compensatory provisions are not thereby
invoked. ' 4 Upon this reasoning, recovery has been denied in a great
many instances.5 In some cases denying a right to compensation, it
has been regarded as immaterial that the injured party took no part
in the horseplay.6 But in a number of cases, the right to compen-
sation has been sustained, where an employee who was injured
through horseplay took no part in the proceedings, but was attending
to his duties.7 In a few instances, compensation has been allowed
2 Chambers v. Oil Co., 199 N. C. 28, 153 S. E. 594 (1930).
'(1930) 18 CALIF. L. REv. 560.
'Re Loper, 64 Ind. App. 571, 116 N. E. 324 (1917).
'Coronado Beach Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 682, 158 Pac. 212 (1916) (Em-
ployee known to co-workers to be very ticklish. Tickled in ribs by one of
them, while he was carrying d bucket downstairs.) ; Great Western Power Co.
v. Industrial Accident Commission, 187 Cal. 295, 201 Pac. 931 (1921) Employee
while in performance of duties struck on leg by fellow-workmen who were
wrestling.); Tarpper v. Weston-Mott Co., 200 Mich. 275, 166 N. W. 857
(1918) (Plaintiff while working was injured by air hose used by fellow-em-
ployee in spirit of play.); Federal Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Com. of California, 187 Cal. 284, 201 Pac. 920 (1921) (Employee sweeping
floor struck in eye by grape thrown by fellow-employee.) ; Lee's Case, 240
Mass. 473, 134 N. E. 268 (1922) (Employee standing in line to punch time
clock, pushed down by other employees indulging in horseplay.); Hulley v.
Moosbrugger, 88 N. J. L. 161, 95 Atl. 1007 (1915) (Plaintiff engaged in duties
fell while trying to avoid blow aimed at hat by fellow-employee) ; Fishering
v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 690, 158 Pac. 215 (1916) (Toy factory employee posed
before trick camera held by another employee and injured -by the spring it
ejected.) ; Pierce v. Boyer-Van Kuran Co., 99 Neb. 321, 156 N. W. 509 (1916) ;
Payne, Dir. Gen. of Ry. v. Industrial Commission, 295 III. 388, 129 N. E. 122
(1920)'; Federal Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Havolic, 162 Wis. 301, 156 N. W. 143
(1916) ; Washburn's Case, 123 Me. 402, 123 Atl. 180 (1924) ; Hazelwood ct al.
v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 208 Ky. 618, 271 S. W. 687 (1925) ; Stuart v.
Kansas City, 102 Kan. 307, 171 Pac. 913 (1918) ; Ward et at. v. Industrial Acc.
Com. of California, 175 Cal. 42, 164 Pac. 1123 (1917).8 Hulley v. Moosbrugger, Pierce v. Boyer-Van Kuran Co., Stuart v. Kansas
City, Tarpper v. Weston-Mott Co., all mipra note 5.
" Chicago, I. and L. Ry. Co. v. Clendenin, 81 Ind. App. 323, 143 N. E. 303(1924) (Car inspector injured by rock thrown by fellow-employee to frighten
him when it rolled off car.) ; Newport Hydrocarbon Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. of
Wisconsin, 167 Wis. 630, 167 N. W. 749 (1918) (Fellow-workman jokingly
connected electric wire to employee's machine.) ; .Knopp v. American Car and
Foundry Co., 186 Ill. App. 605 (1914) (Employee operating trip hammer in-
jured while trying to remove can from under same, placed there by bystander.) ;
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where the injured person took part in the horseplay, but was attend-
ing to his duties at the same time.8 But this seems as far as any of
the courts have gone in allowing recovery. In the cases of injuries
occasioned through horseplay which was commonly carried on with
the consent or at least the acquiescence of the employer, compen-
sation has been allowed in some instances.9
As said in the instant case, it is practically inevitable that work-
men, even of mature years, will indulge in a moment's diversion from
work to joke with or play a prank on a fellow-workman. Such risks
are incident to business and industry, and grow out of them. The
common law put the burden of such risk upon the employee. But
the compensation acts are designed for the very purpose of eliminat-
ing fault as a basis of liability,10 and to insure the employee against
the ordinary risks of the employment. The burden of proof is upon
the employer to prove that the injury was not caused by risk of the
employment. A very satisfactory rule, which should not tend to
increase horseplay in industry, has been expressed by the Oklahoma
Court. This rule denies compensation to the workman who is in-
jured while indulging in horseplay, but grants it to the workman who
Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E. 711 (1920)
(Working employee struck in eye by apple thrown by another employee at a
third.); Industrial Commission v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N. E. 38
(1921) (Employee struck in eye by file which flew from its handle during a
scuffle between other employees.); Boyce v. Burleigh, 112 Neb. 509, 199 N. W.
785 (1924) (Employer kept gun to shoot pigeons. Employee shot by acci-
dental discharge of the weapon in the hands of a fellow-employee.) ; Pekin
Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Board, 277 Ill. 53, 115 N. E. 128 (1917) (Employee
standing in line to receive check thrown down and injured by horseplay on the
part of other employees.) ; Hollenbach v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S. W.
152 (1918) (Employee killed by live wire run to washbasin for horseplay.) ;
Markel v. Daniel Green Felt Co., 221 N. Y. 490, 116 N. E. 1060 (1917) ; Socha
v. Packing Co., 105 Neb. 691, 181 N. W. 706 (1921) ; Willis v. State Industrial
Commission, 78 Okla. 216, 190 Pac. 92 (1920); Keen v. New Amsterdam Cas-
ualty Co., 34 Ga. App. 257, 129 S. E. 174 (1925) ; Marland Refining Co. v. Col-
baugh et al., 110 Okla. 238, 238 Pac. 831 (1925) ; May Chevrolet Co. v. Arm-
strong, 82 Ind. App. 547, 146 N. E. 847 (1925).
*Kansas City Fibre Box Co. v. Connell, 5 Fed. (2nd) 398 (1925) (Em-
ployee operating machine, injured while resisting interference by fellow-work-
man, while continuing his duties.); Martin v. Georgia Casualty Co., 30 Ga.
App. 712, 119 S. E. 337 (1923) (Convict guard on duty playfully toyed with
another guard's pistol. Latter, while attempting to readjust same, accidentally
shot first guard.) ; Stark v. State Ind. Commission, 103 Ore. 80, 204 Pac. 151
(1922).
* In re Loper, supra note 4; State v. District Court, 140 Minn. 75, 167
N. W. 283 (1918); White v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 104 Kan. 90, 177
Pac. 522 (1919); Stuart v. Kansas City, supra note 5; Kokomo Steel and
Wire Co. v. Irick, 80 Ind. App. 610, 141 N. E. 796 (1923) ; Glenn v. Reynold's
Spring Co., 225 Mich. 693, 196 N. W. 617, 36 A. L. R. 1464 (1924).
" Chambers v. Oil Co., supra note 2.
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is injured by the sportive acts of fellow-workmen to which he is not
a party." "Indeed, if a workman be denied compensation solely on
the ground that he was injured by the 'sportive act' of a fellow-
workman, it would seem to be clear that the old 'fellow-servant' doc-
trine is appearing in a brand-new suit of legal clothes and parading
through the law under the brand-new name of 'horseplay.' "12 The
doctrine of horseplay which excludes an injured workman from
compensation, although he is not at fault, seems harsh. The view of
the North Carolina Court in the instant case seems in accordance
with the purpose for which the act was passed.
R. M. GRAY, JR.
OPEN COURT
TAx REFORM IN NORTH CAROLINA
There has been organized in the State of North Carolina, The
North Carolina Tax Relief Association, and also County Tax Relief
Associations in approximately sixty of the counties of this State, for
the purpose of presenting a definite program of Tax Reform to the
1931 session of the General Assembly.
The following resolutions of the North Carolina Tax Relief
Association indicate clearly, in a general way, some of the tax re-
form measures which will certainly be placed before the members of
the coming General Assembly for their consideration.
"1. That this convention demands that the State shall take over
the support of the public schools of the State and relieve the Counties
and School Districts of any part of the cost of maintaining the pub-
lic schools for the full period required by the Constitution.
"2. That the State Highway Commission shall be required to
take over and maintain the public roads and bridges of the public
highways of the State from the funds collected by them as rapidly
as the revenues will permit.
"5. That there shall be adopted a complete reform in the method
of appraisal and valuation of tangible property of the State."
Should the State take over the financing of the public schools and
public roads, the taxes on real properties in the several counties will
be reduced on an average of approximately seventy-five cents on the
one hundred dollars valuation. This should be of material advantage
' Willis v. State Industrial Commission, supra note 7.
' Chambers v. Oil Co., supra note 2.
